R.A. Elmore, S.S. Chirayath, S. Edreev, “Proliferation Resistance Analysis of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities to Quantify the Importance of Containment, Surveillance and Physical Protection Systems”, 2014 American Nuclear Society Winter Meeting, Annaheim, CA, 9-13 November 2014
Assessing nuclear proliferation potential requires consideration of multiple risks for nuclear material acquisition. Texas A&M University developed the Proliferation Resistance Analysis and Evaluation Tool for Observed Risk (PRAETOR) to analyze the intrinsic and extrinsic proliferation resistance of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Proliferation Resistance (PR) is that characteristic of a nuclear energy system that impedes the diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material, or misuse of technology, by States intent on acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Extrinsic PR aspects cover nuclear installation obstacles, while intrinsic PR encompasses special nuclear material (SNM) specific features. Literature over the last few years outlines PRAETOR’s background and multi-attribute utility analysis (MAUA), including the weighting factors obtained for PR attributes from non-proliferation and nuclear technology expert elicitations. An important PRAETOR evolution was the inclusion of Containment and Surveillance (C&S) and Physical Protection System (PPS) attributes. At the state level, adding extrinsic C&S and PPS attributes broadened the range of nuclear material acquisition scenarios that could be assessed by PRAETOR. Five case studies were performed using PRAETOR to estimate the importance of C&S and PPS to PR. With PRAETOR, decision makers at multiple levels can ascertain where resource allocations provide the greatest nonproliferation benefits.