Mohammad Hawila, Sunil S. Chirayath, William Charlton. , “Nuclear Security Risk Evaluation Using Adversary Pathway Analysis Methodology for an Insider-Outsider Collusion Scenario”, INMM 56th Annual Meeting, Indian Wells, California, 12-16 July 2015.
Security preparedness went through several changes since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. Simultaneously there are growing terrorists concerns of attacking a nuclear facility for sabotage and for special nuclear material theft to meet their goals and ideologies. The destruction of critical nuclear infrastructure would have a devastating effect. Physical Protection Systems (PPS) are deployed to prevent the loss of valuable assets. The effectiveness of physical security systems is evaluated and the adversary’s paths to breach the PPS are analyzed to minimize the success of a credible threat posed by adversaries. Existing adversary pathway analysis methodologies to analyze nuclear security is conservative and there is a possibility that it could lead to incorrect results for medium and low risk assets. A modified pathway analysis methodology is presented here for an adversary attack involving insiders working in collusion with outside adversaries for medium risk assets. The goal is to accurately estimate the associated nuclear security risks. Assessment will include the assessment of nuclear security culture as a key component to the detection and mitigation of the insider threat. To test the assessment methodology a typical power reactor complex is analyzed, which also consists of an open pool research reactor. Estimation of the risk will be made utilizing the equation: R = PA (1- PI*PN )*C, where PA is a the probability of attack along a path, PI is the probability of interrupting the adversaries by the response force, PN is the probability of neutralization of the adversaries and C is the consequence from the adversaries success. A path is composed of series of adversary actions to overcome the PPS, each action has delay time (td depends on the capabilities of the adversaries), also detection probability which can occur at several locations along the path. Probability of detection and time delays can be minimized or defeated based on the adversaries’ capabilities. The analysis philosophy is to find out all the possible adversaries’ paths and hence to determine the possible effects on the risk quantification through paths involving insiders working in collusion with outsiders for a typical nuclear facility.