Sunil Chirayath, Royal A. Elmore, “Nuclear Facility Insider and Outsider Threat Upgrades to Proliferation Resistance Analysis Tool, PRAETOR”, INMM 56th Annual Meeting, Indian Wells, California, 12-16 July 2015.
Insider and outsider threat mitigation for nuclear facilities is a crucial factor for understanding how the proliferation resistance of a facility or nuclear fuel cycle can change. New updates to the Texas A&M Proliferation Resistance Analysis and Evaluation Tool for Observed Risk (PRAETOR) incorporate insider and outsider threats in the analysis, in addition to the safeguards attributes1″ aggregation using Multi-Attribute Utility Theory. Insider threats can weaken key nuclear facility barriers to material removal. Outsider threats can overcome nuclear facility security; thereby, weakening trust amongst regional rival states and in the global security arrangement for special nuclear material controls. Leveraging technologies and processes, such as containment and surveillance, for safeguards can enhance some insider and outsider threat reduction. Determining the best places to implement nuclear facility design changes and upgrades to prevent nuclear proliferation is important for long term corporate and political decision makers. New case studies of uranium enrichment facilities producing different 235U enrichment levels and a mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility are analyzed using PRAETOR. The updated PRAETOR proliferation resistance emphasis includes assessment of insider and outside threats impacts. The new PRAETOR case studies in this paper are compared against prior PRAETOR case studies that span a wide range of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Prior case studies include uranium fuel fabrication and small plutonium reprocessing facilities, along with variable pressurized water reactor spent fuel cooling times. Areas of interlocking and strengthened proliferation resistance across multiple threat spectrum are indicated for the nuclear fuel cycle facilities.