# A Transportation Network Perspective for Detecting HEU in Seaborne Containers

## Texas A&M University


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
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#### **The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture**

- Sources: Locations at which material might be obtained
- Pathways: Routes the material must travel to reach its destination
- Detection Sites: Locations of detector systems which may be able to interdict the material
- Targets: Locations at which the material can be used for nefarious purposes




## **Strategic Problem**



- Deal with multiple ports: foreign ports and domestic ports
- Each of these nodes requires a solution to the tactical problem, different operation parameters at different port
- Detector deployment with limited budget: where to deploy what type of detectors?
- Radiography equipment at foreign port or domestic port?

## Simple Network Problem


- Adversary has only one HEU source, and needs to determine when to put it into the container:
  - Before loading at the foreign port, with probability p<sub>O</sub>
  - Infiltrating container during transit, with probability  $p_L$  where  $p_O + p_I = 1$



- Both ports have ATS, passive, and manual detection capabilities.
- ATS node at the foreign port, called  $\mu_{ATS}$ , has a lower trust value than the ATS node at the domestic port.


## Radiography at Domestic Port

- Always obtain correct radiography information
- ATS system at foreign port, and HYB system at the domestic port
- Sojourn time increase at the domestic port due to radiography




## Radiography at Foreign Port

- Use radiography information at both ports
- HYB inspection system at both ports
- Risk of infiltration during transit




#### **Risk of Infiltration**

- Infiltration will turn "easy" container into "hard" container
- Misclassification error and prior distribution change if radiography at the foreign port
- Correct prior information if radiography at the domestic port





## **Prior Information Adjustment**

- Each container scenario has a different detection probability at the foreign port
- Inspection at the foreign port changes prior distribution, P(q<sub>s</sub><sup>HEU</sup>) into the domestic port
- It is advisable to use the prior information and adjust the thresholds at domestic port



#### **Numerical Example**





- Results show that:
  - If infiltration probability is very low (close to 0), choose to install the radiography equipment at the foreign port
  - Otherwise, the radiography equipment should be installed at the domestic port.

