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Analyzing a General Smuggling Network to Optimize the Use of Radiation Portal Monitors for US Homeland Security

Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) are presently deployed across the United States border to deter and defeat radiological and nuclear threats to the homeland.  While many known border crossing points are covered, there remains an unknown number of unknown points of entry for potential RN smugglers.  Decision makers must balance the placement of stationary RPMs against mobile radiation monitors inside the borders.  This projects seeks to analyze an optimal strategy for increasing America's RPMs or investing in mobile radiation monitors by analyzing a general smuggling network and the impact of both strategies in a static game.  

Publications:

  1. M. Subbaiah, W.S. Charlton, R. Elmore, R. Coogan, and D. Sweeney, "Effect of Grouping Motivations on State Proliferation Pathways," 2014 American Nuclear Society Winter Meeting, Annaheim, CA, 9-13 November 2014

 

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