R. Metcalf, A. Bevill, W. Charlton, and R. Bean,
"Safeguards Envelope: Previous Work and Examples,"
Proceedings of 49th Annual INMM Meeting
, Nashville, TN, July 13-17, 2008.
The future expansion of nuclear power will require not just
electricity production but fuel cycle facilities such as fuel
fabrication and reprocessing plants. As large reprocessing
facilities are built around the world, they must be built and
operated in a manner to minimize the risk of nuclear proliferation.
Process monitoring has returned to the spotlight as an added
measure that can increase confidence in the safeguards of special
nuclear material (SNM). Process monitoring can be demonstrated by
Markov Monte Carlo simulations to lengthen the allowable inventory
period by reducing accountancy requirements, and to reduce false
positive indications. The next logical step is the creation of a
Safeguards Envelope, a set of operational parameters and models to
maximize anomaly detection and inventory period by process
monitoring while minimizing operator impact and false positive
rates. A brief example of a rudimentary Safeguards Envelope is
presented, and shown to detect synthetic diversions overlaying a
measured processing plant data set. This demonstration Safeguards
Envelope is shown to increase the confidence that no SNM has been
diverted with minimal operator impact, even though it is based on
an information sparse environment. While the foundation on which a
full Safeguards Envelope can be built has been presented in
historical demonstrations of process monitoring, several
requirements remain yet unfulfilled, such as reprocessing plant
transient models, inclusion of operating data with indirect
correlation to SNM movement, and exploration of new methods of
identifying subtle events in transient processes.
Associated Project(s):The Safeguards Envelope Methodology