Sunil Chirayath, Royal A. Elmore,
"Nuclear Facility Insider and Outsider Threat Upgrades to Proliferation Resistance Analysis Tool, PRAETOR,"
INMM 56th Annual Meeting, Indian Wells, California, 12-16 July 2015.
Insider and outsider threat mitigation for nuclear facilities is
a crucial factor for understanding how the proliferation resistance
of a facility or nuclear fuel cycle can change. New updates to the
Texas A&M Proliferation Resistance Analysis and Evaluation Tool
for Observed Risk (PRAETOR) incorporate insider and outsider
threats in the analysis, in addition to the safeguards attributes'
aggregation using Multi-Attribute Utility Theory. Insider threats
can weaken key nuclear facility barriers to material removal.
Outsider threats can overcome nuclear facility security; thereby,
weakening trust amongst regional rival states and in the global
security arrangement for special nuclear material controls.
Leveraging technologies and processes, such as containment and
surveillance, for safeguards can enhance some insider and outsider
threat reduction. Determining the best places to implement nuclear
facility design changes and upgrades to prevent nuclear
proliferation is important for long term corporate and political
decision makers. New case studies of uranium enrichment facilities
producing different 235U enrichment levels and a mixed oxide fuel
fabrication facility are analyzed using PRAETOR. The updated
PRAETOR proliferation resistance emphasis includes assessment of
insider and outside threats impacts. The new PRAETOR case studies
in this paper are compared against prior PRAETOR case studies that
span a wide range of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Prior case
studies include uranium fuel fabrication and small plutonium
reprocessing facilities, along with variable pressurized water
reactor spent fuel cooling times. Areas of interlocking and
strengthened proliferation resistance across multiple threat
spectrum are indicated for the nuclear fuel cycle facilities.