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Citation:

E. Brown, B. Eldridge, D. Rodriguez, G. M. Gaukler, Y. Ding, C. Li, "Modeling the Detection of Smuggled Nuclear Materials at Land Border Crossings," Poster presented at The 4th annual Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) Academic Research Initiative (ARI) Grantees Conference, Alexandria, Virginia, April 26-28, 2011.

Abstract:

Abstract: 

We model the land port of entry operations that are designed to detect smuggled nuclear materials.  Each land port of entry design in the United States is unique due to the varying amounts of traffic that each port must be capable of processing on a daily basis.  We provide a simulation model of the Laredo, Texas, and Blaine, Washington land border crossings.  The primary performance measures of interest in our simulation are detection probabilities, false alarm rates, and waiting times.  We discuss the impact of waiting space sizes, lane-switching policies, and congestion control measures.  We also investigate the vulnerability of land border crossing inspection policy designs to denial-of-service type attacks by sophisticated adversaries.

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Associated Project(s):

  • SHIELD (Smuggled HEU Interdiction through Enhanced anaLysis and Detection): A Framework for Developing Novel Detection Systems Focused on Interdicting Shielded HEU

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