"Determining the Benefits of Nuclear Material and Arms Control on Nuclear Security,"
55th Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Atlanta, Georgia, 20-14 July 2014.
Nations that enter into a nuclear material or arms control
agreement do so in an effort to enhance or create trust to mitigate
a perceived need to use nuclear assets against another state and to
ensure the security of nuclear material against threats.
Correspondingly, researchers at the Nuclear Security and Science
Institute (NSSPI) at Texas A&M University (TAMU) are
investigating the potential creation of bilateral comprehensive
nuclear material and arms control regimes between states that
exhibit various characteristics of a nuclearly-advanced state as a
means to enhance global nuclear security. A central tenet of this
consideration is establishing a fragile balance that must be
exhibited by both states through maximizing transparency of that
state's actions and yet maximizing opacity of that state's
capabilities and knowledge. Furthermore, the delicate balance
achieved in this potential bilateral accord must positively affect
three settled-upon facets: trust (the partner state's abilities to
believe in the intentions of the other partner state's actions and
intent), confidence (the partner states' capabilities to believe in
each other's technical capabilities), and integrity (the
international community's willingness to believe in the regime).
Ultimately, NSSPI researchers are determining the ideal (maximized)
levels of trust, confidence, and integrity that can be attained
within a bilateral material and arms control regime in order to
best enhance global nuclear security. This paper conveys the work
put forth in creating a game tree model of a hypothetical bilateral
regime and how various actions by actors can lead to varying levels
of trust, confidence and integrity. This work is part of a larger
effort being conducted at TAMU-NSSPI in developing a systematic
approach to evaluate comprehensive material and arms control
agreements as an engagement tool to non-NPT nuclear weapon