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Nuclear Safeguards Education Portal
  

Safeguards by Design for ISFSI

IAEA safeguards and inspections can be significantly helped or hindered by the facility design.  Therefore, it is critical for facility designers to plan for safeguards application during the design phase of the facility.  Figure 18 shows an idealized layout of the safeguards equipment for a typical ISFSI. 

Iaea -idealized -layout

 Figure 18. Idealized ISFSI layout. (Source: Ref. 3)

The idealized layout above adds multiple requirements for facility design.

Safeguards design requirements:

  • Surveillance systems
    • Space and power for systems including associated electronics
    • Layout arrangement with clear fields of vision
    • Facility operations that do not impede function
  • Sealing systems
    • Space within facility for seal to be installed, verified, and/or removed
    • Compatible storage casks, vaults, and containers
    • Facility operations that do not impede function
  • Radiation detection systems
    • Access points and space at strategic locations within the facility to use radiation detection systems for verifications
  • Remote monitoring
    • Electronic transmission systems to transfer data to IAEA
  • Re-establishing continuity of knowledge
    • Facility designers should consider how nuclear materials may be re-verified if continuity of knowledge over safeguarded materials is lost for any reason.  Difficult tasks like opening spent fuel storage casks may need to be done.  Designers should plan for such contingencies to be executed in safe conditions.
  • Inspector accommodations
    • Office space   
    • Access and unobstructed observation areas for safeguards activities for nuclear materials and facility design verification
    • Facility operations that do not impede function 

 

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