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Nuclear Safeguards Education Portal
  

Threat Assessment

Casks of highly enriched uranium being taken off of a truck. (Photo Source: USA Today)
Casks of highly enriched uranium being taken off of a truck. (Photo Source: USA Today) 

Before designing a PPS, it is important to know against whom you are protecting your facility. This is particularly true in the DEPO process, which relies on the concept of threat-informed security design. The threat assessment is therefore essential to establishing the required performance criteria of the PPS

Typically, threats are broken into three broad categories:

1. Insiders

Insiders include anyone with unescorted access to the facility as well as knowledge of operations or security systems at the facility. Insiders can be futher divided into three sub-categories:

  • Passive - the insider does not actively participate in any operation by the adversary but provides information such as target locations and security procedures
  • Active nonviolent - the insider actively assists an operation through actions such as facilitating the adversary's entrance into the facility or disabling alarms along the adversary's path
  • Active violent - the insider participates in a violent attack

While multiple insiders are possible, emphasis is typically placed on addressing a single insider, which is the most likely insider threat that exists.

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