Conclusions drawn by the IAEA on the basis of findings from its verification and evaluation activities. Safeguards conclusions are drawn for each State with a safeguards agreement in force, and, where appropriate, for a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) and an additional protocol based on [540*] in force. These conclusions are reported collectively for States in the annual Safeguards Implementation Report.
For each State with a safeguards agreement in force, a conclusion is drawn relating to the nondiversion of nuclear material placed under safeguards (and, under an INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreement, to the non-misuse of items specified and placed under safeguards). The conclusion also relates to the absence of undeclared production or separation of direct use material at reactors, reprocessing facilities, hot cells and/or enrichment installations under safeguards. Where there is no indication of diversion of the nuclear material (or of misuse of specified items) placed under safeguards or of undeclared production or separation of direct use material at declared facilities, the conclusion is drawn for the year concerned that the nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or were otherwise adequately accounted for.
For each State with a CSA and an additional protocol based on [540*] in force, a broader conclusion can be drawn for the year concerned that all of the nuclear material in the State had been placed under safeguards and remained in peaceful nuclear activities or was otherwise adequately accounted for. To be able to draw this conclusion, the IAEA must draw the conclusions of both the non-diversion of the nuclear material placed under safeguards (as described above) and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the State as a whole. The conclusion of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities is drawn when the activities performed under an additional protocol have been completed, when relevant questions and inconsistencies have been addressed, and when no indications have been found by the IAEA that, in its judgment, would constitute a safeguards concern.
Note: The term 'safeguards conclusions', as used here, refers exclusively to the two conclusions drawn annually for States, as described above. These conclusions differ from the technical safeguards conclusions, which, according to INFCIRC 153*, are drawn by the IAEA from its nuclear material verification activities for each material balance area over a material balance period and reported to the State concerned in a Statement on Conclusions.