-
Technical Safeguards Terminology
- Purpose, Objective, and Scope of IAEA Safeguards
- Safeguards Approaches, Concepts, and Measures
- Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Material: Basic Terms
- Nuclear and Nuclear-Related Activities and Installations
- Nuclear Material Accountancy
- Nuclear Material Measurement Techniques and Equipment
- Containment, Surveillance, and Monitoring
- Environmental Sampling
- Safeguards Information and Evaluation
- > > Physical Protection Systems
- Acceptance testing
- Access control
- Activated Delay
- Activated denial
- Adversary
- Adversary Action Sequence
- Adversary class
- Adversary neutralization
- Adversary path
- Adversary Sequence Diagram
- Adversary sequence modeling
- Adversary task
- Alarm assessment
- Alarm Communication and Display (AC&D)
- Alternate access points
- Assessment
- Automated access control system
- Central Alarm Station
- Contraband
- DDDRR of Security Risk
- Deceit
- Defeat
- Defense in Depth
- Delay
- Denial
- Deployment
- Design and Evalution Process Outline (DEPO)
- Design Basis Threat (DBT)
- Detection
- Deterrence
- Diversion
- Entry control
- Event
- Facility Characterization
- False Alarm
- Force
- Guards
- IAEA Categorization of Nuclear Material
- Impostor pass rate
- Improvised nuclear device (IND)
- Inner Area
- Insider
- Intrusion Detection
- Isolation zone
- Local Communications
- Material Access Area
- Nations that Are Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
- Nuclear terrorism
- Nuisance Alarm
- Nuisance Alarm Rate (NAR)
- Outsider
- Path
- Patrol
- Performance Criteria Approach
- Physical Barrier
- Physical Protection Systems
- Physical Security
- Probability of detection
- Probability of interruption
- Probability of Neutralization
- Probability of sensing
- Protected Area
- Radiological dispersion device (RDD)
- Radiological exposure device (RED)
- Requirements for Physical Protection Against Unauthorized Removal of Nuclear Material in Use and Storage
- Response force time
- Response Forces
- Risk Assessment
- Sabotage
- Scenario
- Security Survey
- Single Path Analysis
- Stealth
- Target Identification
- Theft
- Threat
- Threat Assessment
- Timely Detection
- Transport
- Transport Control Center
- Unauthorized Removal
- Upgrade
- Vehicle-born improvised explosive device
- Vital Area
- Vulnerability
- Zone
- Threats to Nuclear Security
- Index of Terms
Radiological Exposure Device (RED)
or Radiological Emitting Device. Also called a "hidden sealed source." An RED is a terrorist device intended to expose people to significant doses of ionizing radiation without their knowledge. Constructed from partially or fully unshielded radioactive material, an RED could be hidden from sight in a public place (e.g., under a subway seat, in a food court, or in a busy hallway), exposing those who sit or pass close by. If the seal around the source were broken and the radioactive contents released from the container, the device could become a radiological dispersal device (RDD), capable of causing radiological contamination (REMM).
-
Technical Safeguards Terminology
- Purpose, Objective, and Scope of IAEA Safeguards
- Safeguards Approaches, Concepts, and Measures
- Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Material: Basic Terms
- Nuclear and Nuclear-Related Activities and Installations
- Nuclear Material Accountancy
- Nuclear Material Measurement Techniques and Equipment
- Containment, Surveillance, and Monitoring
- Environmental Sampling
- Safeguards Information and Evaluation
- > > Physical Protection Systems
- Acceptance testing
- Access control
- Activated Delay
- Activated denial
- Adversary
- Adversary Action Sequence
- Adversary class
- Adversary neutralization
- Adversary path
- Adversary Sequence Diagram
- Adversary sequence modeling
- Adversary task
- Alarm assessment
- Alarm Communication and Display (AC&D)
- Alternate access points
- Assessment
- Automated access control system
- Central Alarm Station
- Contraband
- DDDRR of Security Risk
- Deceit
- Defeat
- Defense in Depth
- Delay
- Denial
- Deployment
- Design and Evalution Process Outline (DEPO)
- Design Basis Threat (DBT)
- Detection
- Deterrence
- Diversion
- Entry control
- Event
- Facility Characterization
- False Alarm
- Force
- Guards
- IAEA Categorization of Nuclear Material
- Impostor pass rate
- Improvised nuclear device (IND)
- Inner Area
- Insider
- Intrusion Detection
- Isolation zone
- Local Communications
- Material Access Area
- Nations that Are Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
- Nuclear terrorism
- Nuisance Alarm
- Nuisance Alarm Rate (NAR)
- Outsider
- Path
- Patrol
- Performance Criteria Approach
- Physical Barrier
- Physical Protection Systems
- Physical Security
- Probability of detection
- Probability of interruption
- Probability of Neutralization
- Probability of sensing
- Protected Area
- Radiological dispersion device (RDD)
- Radiological exposure device (RED)
- Requirements for Physical Protection Against Unauthorized Removal of Nuclear Material in Use and Storage
- Response force time
- Response Forces
- Risk Assessment
- Sabotage
- Scenario
- Security Survey
- Single Path Analysis
- Stealth
- Target Identification
- Theft
- Threat
- Threat Assessment
- Timely Detection
- Transport
- Transport Control Center
- Unauthorized Removal
- Upgrade
- Vehicle-born improvised explosive device
- Vital Area
- Vulnerability
- Zone
- Threats to Nuclear Security
- Index of Terms
