-
Technical Safeguards Terminology
- Purpose, Objective, and Scope of IAEA Safeguards
- Safeguards Approaches, Concepts, and Measures
- Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Material: Basic Terms
- Nuclear and Nuclear-Related Activities and Installations
- Nuclear Material Accountancy
- Nuclear Material Measurement Techniques and Equipment
- Containment, Surveillance, and Monitoring
- Environmental Sampling
- Safeguards Information and Evaluation
- > > Physical Protection Systems
- Acceptance testing
- Access control
- Activated Delay
- Activated denial
- Adversary
- Adversary Action Sequence
- Adversary class
- Adversary neutralization
- Adversary path
- Adversary Sequence Diagram
- Adversary sequence modeling
- Adversary task
- Alarm assessment
- Alarm Communication and Display (AC&D)
- Alternate access points
- Assessment
- Automated access control system
- Central Alarm Station
- Contraband
- DDDRR of Security Risk
- Deceit
- Defeat
- Defense in Depth
- Delay
- Denial
- Deployment
- Design and Evalution Process Outline (DEPO)
- Design Basis Threat (DBT)
- Detection
- Deterrence
- Diversion
- Entry control
- Event
- Facility Characterization
- False Alarm
- Force
- Guards
- IAEA Categorization of Nuclear Material
- Impostor pass rate
- Improvised nuclear device (IND)
- Inner Area
- Insider
- Intrusion Detection
- Isolation zone
- Local Communications
- Material Access Area
- Nations that Are Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
- Nuclear terrorism
- Nuisance Alarm
- Nuisance Alarm Rate (NAR)
- Outsider
- Path
- Patrol
- Performance Criteria Approach
- Physical Barrier
- Physical Protection Systems
- Physical Security
- Probability of detection
- Probability of interruption
- Probability of Neutralization
- Probability of sensing
- Protected Area
- Radiological dispersion device (RDD)
- Radiological exposure device (RED)
- Requirements for Physical Protection Against Unauthorized Removal of Nuclear Material in Use and Storage
- Response force time
- Response Forces
- Risk Assessment
- Sabotage
- Scenario
- Security Survey
- Single Path Analysis
- Stealth
- Target Identification
- Theft
- Threat
- Threat Assessment
- Timely Detection
- Transport
- Transport Control Center
- Unauthorized Removal
- Upgrade
- Vehicle-born improvised explosive device
- Vital Area
- Vulnerability
- Zone
- Threats to Nuclear Security
- Index of Terms
Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)
Also called an Improvised Nuclear Explosive Device (INED).
Improvised nuclear devices or (INDs) are theoretical illicit nuclear weapons bought, stolen, or otherwise originating from a nuclear state, or a weapon fabricated by a terrorist group from illegally obtained fissile nuclear weapons material that produces a nuclear explosion. An IND would be built from the components of a stolen weapon or from scratch using nuclear material (plutonium or highly enriched uranium). It would produce same physical and medical effects as nuclear weapon. A successful detonation would result in catastrophic loss of life, destruction of infrastructure, and nuclear contamination of a very large area. (Wikipedia)
Department of Homeland Security definition:
An improvised nuclear device (IND) is a device built from components of a stolen weapon or from scratch using nuclear material that could produce nuclear explosions.
Related Links
-
Technical Safeguards Terminology
- Purpose, Objective, and Scope of IAEA Safeguards
- Safeguards Approaches, Concepts, and Measures
- Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Material: Basic Terms
- Nuclear and Nuclear-Related Activities and Installations
- Nuclear Material Accountancy
- Nuclear Material Measurement Techniques and Equipment
- Containment, Surveillance, and Monitoring
- Environmental Sampling
- Safeguards Information and Evaluation
- > > Physical Protection Systems
- Acceptance testing
- Access control
- Activated Delay
- Activated denial
- Adversary
- Adversary Action Sequence
- Adversary class
- Adversary neutralization
- Adversary path
- Adversary Sequence Diagram
- Adversary sequence modeling
- Adversary task
- Alarm assessment
- Alarm Communication and Display (AC&D)
- Alternate access points
- Assessment
- Automated access control system
- Central Alarm Station
- Contraband
- DDDRR of Security Risk
- Deceit
- Defeat
- Defense in Depth
- Delay
- Denial
- Deployment
- Design and Evalution Process Outline (DEPO)
- Design Basis Threat (DBT)
- Detection
- Deterrence
- Diversion
- Entry control
- Event
- Facility Characterization
- False Alarm
- Force
- Guards
- IAEA Categorization of Nuclear Material
- Impostor pass rate
- Improvised nuclear device (IND)
- Inner Area
- Insider
- Intrusion Detection
- Isolation zone
- Local Communications
- Material Access Area
- Nations that Are Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
- Nuclear terrorism
- Nuisance Alarm
- Nuisance Alarm Rate (NAR)
- Outsider
- Path
- Patrol
- Performance Criteria Approach
- Physical Barrier
- Physical Protection Systems
- Physical Security
- Probability of detection
- Probability of interruption
- Probability of Neutralization
- Probability of sensing
- Protected Area
- Radiological dispersion device (RDD)
- Radiological exposure device (RED)
- Requirements for Physical Protection Against Unauthorized Removal of Nuclear Material in Use and Storage
- Response force time
- Response Forces
- Risk Assessment
- Sabotage
- Scenario
- Security Survey
- Single Path Analysis
- Stealth
- Target Identification
- Theft
- Threat
- Threat Assessment
- Timely Detection
- Transport
- Transport Control Center
- Unauthorized Removal
- Upgrade
- Vehicle-born improvised explosive device
- Vital Area
- Vulnerability
- Zone
- Threats to Nuclear Security
- Index of Terms
